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1.  Introduction 
     Some languages develop grammatical items concerning a semantic category 
“whose primary meaning is speaker’s unprepared mind, unexpected new information, 
and concomitant surprise” (Aikhenvald (2004:209)).  This category is generally 
called mirativity (cf. DeLancey (1997)).  For example, in Magar, a Tibeto-Burman 
language spoken in Nepal, mirativity is expressed by “the verb stem plus 
nominaliser o, followed by le, [i.e.] a grammaticalised copula, functioning as an 
auxiliary and marker of imperfective aspect: �-o le [STEM-NOM IMPF]” 
(Grunow-Hårsta (2007: 175)).  Let us compare the following sentences:1 
 
 (1)  a.  thapa i-laŋ le 
     Thapa P.Dem-Loc Cop 
     ‘Thapa is here’ (non-mirative) 
   b.  thapa i-laŋ le-o le 
     Thapa P.Dem-Loc Cop-Nom Impf 
     (I realize to my surprise that) ‘Thapa is here’ 
(Grunow-Hårsta (2007:175)) 
 
According to Grunow-Hårsta (2007:175), the non-mirative sentence in (1a) “simply 
conveys information, making no claims as to its novelty or the speaker’s 
psychological reaction to it”; on the other hand, the mirative sentence in (1b), as the 
English translation shows, “conveys that the information is new and unexpected and 
is as much about this surprising newness as it is about the information itself.”  In 
other words, this information has not been integrated into the speaker’s knowledge, 
and hence, it is evaluated as unexpected. 
Mirativity has gradually attracted attention since the seminal work of 
DeLancey (1997) and various mirative items have been detected in a number of 
languages.  Unfortunately, however, there are very few studies which 
systematically and comprehensively investigate Japanese in terms of mirativity.2  
                                                  
* I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Masatoshi Honda, Teppei Otake, and Toshinao 
Nakazawa for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples in this paper: Acc = 
accusative, Cop = copula, Gen = genitive, Dat = dative, Evid = evidential, Impf = imperfective, 
Infer = inferential, Loc = locative, Mir = mirative, Mod = modality, Nom = nominative, P.Dem = 
proximal demonstrative, Pf = perfective, Pol = polite, SFP = sentence-final particle, Top = topic. 
2 Suzuki (1999) is an exception.  She proposes that the Japanese quotative particle datte 
serves as a mirative marker (see also Suzuki (2006)); more specifically, datte expresses the 
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In this sense, the study on mirativity in Japanese is in an early phase of development, 
and thus further investigations are required to fully understand the Japanese mirative 
system.  Hoping to explore and develop this immature field, I will demonstrate that 
the sentence-final particle no, as in (2) and (3), falls under the category of 
mirativity.3  No is grammatically a nominalizer.  A clause nominalized by no is 
presented as unexpected information. 
 
 (2)  Koko-ni ita n da. (n is a phonological variant of no.) 
   here-Dat be Mir Cop 
   ‘That is where you are.’ 
 (3)  [The speaker came back to his house, and found the rooms ransacked.] 
   Doroboo-ga haitta n da. 
   theft-Nom enter.Past Mir Cop 
   ‘Someone must have broken into my house.’ 
 
The sentence in (2) can be uttered in a context in which the speaker found the hearer 
in an unexpected place, and hence implies his surprise.  Without no (and the 
following copula verb da, which cannot immediately follow verbs), the sentence 
(i.e., Koko-ni ita.) merely expresses the speaker’s discovery of the hearer, and no 
longer indicates the speaker’s unexpectedness (cf. Inoue (2001:144-145)).4  In (3), 
                                                                                                                                                            
unexpectedness of the statement by a third person. 
 
 (i) [The speaker and the hearer are talking about a woman. 
  “Watasi, kekkon suru wa” datte! (Sinji-rare-nai yo.) 
  I marriage do Feminine-marker Mir believe-be able to-not SFP 
 ‘[A woman said] “I am getting married.”  (I can’t believe it.)’ 
 
Datte in (i) is used to quote the statement made by a woman, signaling that the speaker finds the 
woman’s marriage unexpected.  It is, however, the accepted view that mirativity “makes no claims 
about the source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or hearsay” 
(Watters (2002:300)).  We must thus contemplate that datte is, by nature, a mirative expression.  
In fact, reported evidentials in some languages are used as a mirative strategy; they receive mirative 
interpretation in some context (cf. Aikhenvald (2004)).  This issue, however, is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  I will leave it for future research. 
3  I found, through the internet, the paper entitled “Evidentiality and Mirativity on 
Sentence-Final Predicates in Japanese and Korean: A Particular Attention to ‘Kes-ita’ and ‘Noda’” 
(인인인인 66, pp. 27-48 (2012)) written by 김김김 (the original title is in Korean).  The paper 
is written in Korean, with which I am not familiar.  However, fortunately, English abstract is 
available on the website http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Journal/ArticleDetail/NODE02076028.  
According to the abstract, the paper assumes that the nominalizer no encodes an inferential 
evidential, and is extended to the mirativity; namely, no can be used as a mirative strategy.  On the 
other hand, I propose that no is, by nature, a mirative marker, and should not be considered an 
evidential (see section 2); the inferential interpretation is not related to its meaning, because 
mirativity is ignorance of the source of information (see the discussion below).   
4 Following Inoue’s (2001) analysis, the sentence Koko-ni ita implies that the speaker has 
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the speaker infers from the situation he sees in front of him that someone broke into 
his house.  The information inferred is readily associated with the notion 
unexpectedness because it implies that the speaker had not known it before the 
inference took place (cf. DeLancey (2001)); in other words, the information has not 
been integrated into the speaker’s knowledge.  The information in (3) can actually 
be interpreted as unexpected information to the speaker:  he has not expected that 
someone broke into his house.  Without no, the speaker merely makes an assertive, 
or exclamatory, statement about the relevant event. 
     “The concept of ‘mirativity’ is a relatively recent arrival on the typological 
scene” (Aikhenvald (2012:435)), and thus it has yet to be fully understood.  In fact, 
there still remain controversial issues such as what semantic range mirativity covers, 
and whether it is an independent category from others like evidentiality (see 
Aikhenvald (2012) for detailed discussion).  Discussions on the sentence-final 
particle no will contribute to deepening the understanding of this immature concept 
in several respects.  For instance, mirativity is generally defined in terms of the 
speaker’s unexpectedness (cf. DeLancey (1997), Aikhenvald (2004)).  However, 
Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012) propose that mirativity is also related to 
unexpectedness to the hearer (see also Aikhenvald (2012)).  The following sentence 
lends support to their proposal: 
 
 (4)  Kyoo-wa yasumi masu. Kaze-o hiita n desu. 
   today-Top be absent from Pol cold-Acc caught Mir Cop.Pol 
   ‘I will not go (to school).  I’ve caught a cold.’ 
 
The sentence-final particle no has been traditionally regarded as an explanation 
marker (cf. Alfonso (1966), Kuno (1973)).  Here, the sentence with no provides an 
explanation for why he will be absent (from, say, school).  Notice that the 
information conveyed has already been established to the speaker and thus it is not 
unexpected to him; rather, the speaker intends to convey unexpected information to 
the hearer.  The observation in (4) leads us to conclude that, as Hengeveld and 
Olbertz (2012) point out, mirativity can be concerned with the hearer’s perspective 
(I will discuss sentences like in (4) in more detail later).  Other aspects of no which 
I will make clear in the following sections will also make it possible to promote 
better understanding of mirativity. 
     The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly overviews 
Aoki’s (1986) proposal that the sentence-final particle no is an evidential marker and 
argues that in describing its semantic aspect, mirativity is preferable to evidentiality.  
                                                                                                                                                            
expected, to some extent, that the hearer is in the place in question. 
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Section 3 provides supporting evidence for the proposal that no is a mirative marker.  
Section 4 deals with examples which, at first sight, are counter-examples to the 
proposal in this paper.  However, I will show that they, on the contrary, reflect a 
certain property of mirativity.  Section 5 shows that no expresses unexpectedness to 
the hearer as well as the speaker.  Section 6 concludes this paper. 
 
2.  Previous Studies: Is the Sentence-Final Particle No an Evidential Marker? 
     Before giving supporting evidence for the claim that the sentence-final 
particle no is a mirative marker, I will touch on previous studies which regard it as 
an evidential one.  Evidentiality and mirativity are similar in that they “essentially 
delineate the speaker’s relationship, either physically or psychologically, to 
experienced events and states” (Dickinson (2000:381)).  In fact, a number of 
studies have constantly discussed the conceptual relationship between them (cf. 
DeLancey (1997, 2001), Lazard (1999), Aikhenvald (2004, 2012)).  Although they 
have conceptual similarities, this section argues that mirativity provides a more 
reasonable basis for analyzing no than evidentiality. 
Aoki (1986) claims that no is an evidential marker; “[a]n evidential no, or 
more informal n, may be used to state that the speaker is convinced that for some 
reason what is ordinarily directly unknowable is nevertheless true” (Aoki 
(1986:228); see also Simpson (2003)).  For example:5 
 
 (5)  Kare-wa atui no da. 
   he-Top hot Evid Cop 
   ‘I know that he is hot. It is a fact that he is hot.’ (Aoki (1986:228)) 
 
Here, the sentence describes the sensation of a third-party, which is not directly 
accessible to the speaker.  No indicates that the speaker judges this inaccessible, or 
unknowable, information to be true.   
Aoki’s proposal, however, is highly controversial because of the vagueness of 
the notion evidentiality.  Evidentiality can be conceptually divided into at least two 
types: the evidentiality in the broad sense and that in the narrow sense (Willett 
(1988)).  The former is concerned with the speaker’s epistemological attitude 
toward his knowledge of a situation as well as the source of information, and the 
latter with only the source of information.  If we define evidentiality in the narrow 
sense, no cannot be considered to be an evidential because “[t]his morpheme can be 
interpreted as referring to validation of information rather than the way it was 
obtained” (Aikhenvald (2004:81)).  We thus should be careful in analyzing no in 
                                                  
5 Here, I use Evid as a gloss of no instead of Mir. 
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terms of evidentiality. 
In addition, it should be noted that Aoki considers the information conveyed 
by the sentence with no to be “ordinarily directly unknowable” (see also Kamio 
(1997:65)).  His description implies the possibility that no falls under the class of 
mirativity rather than that of evidentiality because “unknowable” is conceptually 
similar to “unexpected” in that they imply that the information in question has not 
been integrated into the speaker’s (or the hearer’s) knowledge.  So, I assume that in 
order to deepen the understanding of no, mirativity is more conceptually suitable 
than evidentiality. 
     Furthermore, the following sentences lead us to consider no a mirative 
marker: 
 
 (6)  Koko-ni ita n da. direct perception 
   here-Dat be Mir Cop 
   ‘That is where you are.’ (= (2)) 
 (7)  [The speaker came back to his house, and found the rooms ransacked.] 
   Doroboo-ga haitta n da. inference 
   theft-Nom enter.Past Mir Cop 
   ‘Someone must have broken into my house.’ (= (3)) 
 (8)  A:  Watasi, kekkon simasu. 
     I marriage do.Pol 
     ‘I’m getting married.’ 
   B:  E!? Kekkon suru no? hearsay 
     what marriage do Mir 
     ‘What!?  Are you getting married?’ 
 
Generally speaking, unlike evidentiality, mirativity “makes no claims about the 
source of information, [and] can occur with first-hand observation, inference, or 
hearsay” (Watters (2002:300)).  The sentence-final particle no follows this general 
tendency of mirativity.  In (6), the sentence conveys that the information is 
acquired through the visual sense.  In (7), the speaker infers from the situation he 
sees in front of him that someone broke into his house.  In (8), speaker B expresses 
his surprise at what speaker A has just said.  These examples suggest that as with 
mirative markers found in other languages, no is not subject to the source of 
information.  It is thus reasonable to consider that no is subsumed under the 
mirative category, rather than the evidential one. 
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3.  Proposal 
     As mentioned in section 1, I would like to propose that the sentence-final 
particle no is a mirative marker.  In what follows, I will provide supporting 
evidence for this claim.  
 
3.1.  Incompatibility with Adverbs Denoting Expectation 
     The oddity of the following examples suggests that the speaker’s sense of 
unexpectedness must be involved in no:6 
 
 (9) * Omottatoori, ippai iru n da. 
   as is expected many be Mir Cop 
   ‘As is expected, there are many people here.’ 
(Noda (1997:87), with modifications) 
 (10) * Sasuga, kyaputen na n da. 
   as is to be expected captain Cop Mir Cop 
   ‘As is to be expected, you are a captain (of our team).’ 
 
The adverb omottatoori indicates that the event in question is expected to happen; in 
(9), the speaker expects that a number of people are in the place in question.  
Sasuga introduces information which has been expected to be true (cf. Morita 
(1989)); in (10), the speaker re-realizes that, as he has expected, the person in 
question deserves the captain of, say, a baseball team due to his outstanding play.  
As shown in (9) and (10), these adverbs are incompatible with no.  In fact, the 
sentences become acceptable if they are omitted, as in the following examples: 
 
 (11)  Omottatoori, ippai iru. (cf. (9)) 
 (12)  Sasuga, kyaputen da. (cf. (10)) 
 
The incompatibility of no with omottatoori and sasuga suggests the association with 
unexpectedness.   
 
3.2.  Information Known to the Speaker 
     Tanomura (1990) points out that the following sentence containing no sounds 
unnatural: 
 
 (13)  [The speaker failed to make a contract.  She speculates on the reason for 
this failure.] 
                                                  
6 Example (10) was pointed out to me by Masatoshi Honda (p.c.). 
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  * Kitto watasi-ga miseenen na n da. 
   surely I-Nom under age Cop Mir Cop 
   ‘I must be under age.’ (Tanomura (1990:39)) 
 
Here, the speaker concludes that she could not make a contract because she is under 
age.  Notice that the information that the speaker is under age is assumed to be 
evident to the speaker; this information is not unexpected to her.  In this case, the 
sentence containing no sounds unnatural.  In (13), we must not choose no, but must 
choose the sentence-final particle kara ‘because,’ which is not associated with 
mirativity, as shown in (14). 
 
 (14)  [The speaker failed to make a contract.  She speculates on the reason for 
this failure.] 
   Kitto watasi-ga miseenen da kara da. 
   surely I-Nom under age Cop because Cop 
   ‘It is because I am under age.’ (Tanomura (1990:39)) 
 
Even in the same context as in (13), however, the sentence is acceptable if the 
information inferred has not been established to the speaker prior to speech time.  
Let us consider the following example: 
 
 (15)  [The speaker failed to make a contract.  She speculates on the reason for 
this failure.] 
   Kitto watasi-ga situreina koto-o itta n da. 
   surly  I-Nom rude thing-Acc say.Past Mir Cop 
   ‘I must have said something rude.’ 
 
In (15), the speaker is assumed to realize at speech time that she was rude when 
talking about a contract, and to conclude that her rudeness resulted in the failure of 
the contract.  Thus, the information that the speaker was rude can be regarded as 
unexpected.  In this case, the use of no is fully acceptable.  The examples given 
above show that no introduces unexpected information.   
 
3.3.  The Speaker’s Uncertainty 
     As discussed above, the mirative marker no is not licensed when the sentence 
in question describes the event expected by the speaker.  Let us first consider the 
sentence in (16), which we assume has been uttered in the situation where the 
speaker just put on a heater. 
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 (16) * Korede atatakaku naru n daroo. 
   that   warm become Mir Mod 
   ‘The room will warm up.’ 
 
The speaker put on the heater with the intention of warming up the room; thus, he 
has expected that the event described in (16) will happen after he puts on the heater.  
In this situation, the use of no degrades the acceptability of the sentence.  We 
should omit no from the sentence, as follows: 
 
 (17)  Korede atatakaku naru daroo. (cf. (16)) 
 
Notice that the sentence in (16) becomes acceptable if the sentence-final particle ka 
is attached at the end of the sentence:  
 
 (18)  Korede atatakaku naru n daroo ka. 
   that   warm become Mir Mod SFP(uncertainty) 
   ‘I wonder whether the room will warm up.’ 
 
Ka signals the speaker’s uncertainty (cf. Moriyama (1989), Hirose (1995), Takiura 
(2008)).  Thus in (18), the speaker is uncertain about whether the room will warm 
up or not; in other words, the speaker does not expect that the heater will warm up 
the room.  Hence the acceptability of the sentence with no. 
 
3.4.  Yes-No Questions 
     The sentence-final particle no can appear in yes-no questions, as exemplified 
in the following example: 
 
 (19)  A:  Kyoo-wa yasumimasu. 
     today-Top absent from.Pol 
     ‘I will be absent (from school) today.’ 
   B:  Karada-no guai demo warui n desu ka? 
     body-Gen feel or something bad Mir Cop.Pol SFP 
     “Are you sick or something?” (Tanomura (1990:63)) 
 
Here, speaker B infers that speaker A is sick.  Speaker B is assumed not to know 
speaker A’s illness, so he is using no to express unexpectedness.  As with 
declarative sentences with no like (13) and (16), yes-no questions with no sound 
unnatural if the information conveyed has already been established to the speaker, as 
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shown in the following example: 
 
 (20)  A:  Kyoo-wa yasumimasu. 
     today-Top absent from.Pol 
     ‘I will be absent (from school) today.’ 
   B: * Tenki-ga warui n desu ka? 
     weather-Nom bad Mir Cop.Pol SFP 
     ‘Is the weather bad?’ (Tanomura (1990:63)) 
 
Suppose that speakers A and B live in the same town and both know the weather 
there.  In this case, the information on the weather is not unexpected to speaker B, 
which makes the use of no unacceptable. 
     Furthermore, we can capture the difference between questions with and 
without no.  Let us compare the following sentences: 
 
 (21)  a.  Kinoo eega-e ikimasita ka? 
     yesterday movie-to went.Pol SFP 
     ‘Did you go to a movie yesterday?’ 
   b.  Kinoo eega-e itta n desu ka? 
     yesterday movie-to went Mir Cop.Pol SFP 
     i. ‘Is it that you went to a movie yesterday?’ [inference] 
     ii. ‘You went to a movie yesterday?’ [echo-question]7 
(McGloin (1980:123), with modifications) 
 
According to McGloin (1980:123), the sentence in (21a) “is a simple, 
information-seeking question”; the speaker is just seeking the truth value of the 
proposition.  In (21b), on the other hand, “the speaker indicates that he assumes 
that the listener went to a movie and questions whether his assumption is correct” 
(McGloin (1980:123)); the speaker infers the propositional content from some 
contextual hints (e.g., he found a ticket of the movie).  In addition, sentence (21b) 
can also be interpreted as an echo-question (see English translation (ii)) if it is 
uttered as a reply to utterances like: 
 
 (22)  Kinoo  eega-e itta yo. 
   yesterday movie-to went SFP(I tell you) 
   ‘I went to a movie yesterday.’ 
 
                                                  
7 The interpretation in (ii) is mine. 
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The difference in interpretation between (21a) and (21b) can be attributed to the 
mirative meaning of no.  Because of the use of no, the sentence in (21b) receives 
the interpretation that the information conveyed has not resided in the speaker’s 
knowledge before speech time.  So this sentence can be seen as a conclusion of 
inference or as a repetition of what the hearer has just said (both interpretations 
imply that the information is obtained at speech time and has not been integrated 
into the speaker’s knowledge).  In (21a), on the other hand, the sentence does not 
linguistically indicate that the information has been absent from the speaker’s 
knowledge, because, unlike in (21b), the mirative marker no is not used here.  So 
sentence (21a) is not related to the inferential and echo-question interpretations, 
merely asking the hearer to specify the truth value of the proposition. 
 
3.5.  Wh-Questions 
     The sentence-final particle no can also be used in wh-questions.  Again, 
McGloin (1980) observes the difference between wh-questions with and without no.  
For example: 
 
 (23)  a.  Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku? 
     today(-Top) where-to go 
     ‘Where shall we go today?’ 
   b.  Kyoo(-wa) doko-e iku no? 
     today(-Top) where-to go Mir 
     ‘Where are we going today?’ 
(McGloin (1980:128)) 
 
Suppose that the speaker and the hearer are ready to go out for lunch together.  
According to McGloin (1980), the wh-question in (23a) indicates that the speaker 
tries to decide where they are going by discussing with the hearer, while that in 
(23b) indicates that the speaker is not involved in the decision as to where they are 
going and merely asks the hearer to provide the answer.  The difference between 
(23a) and (23b) observed by McGloin (1980) naturally comes from the mirative 
meaning of no.  In wh-questions, the information conveyed by elements other than 
the wh-word is normally presupposed.  In (23), for instance, the speaker has 
already known that he and the hearer will go somewhere.  Thus, when no appears 
in wh-questions, the unexpected information is the value of the wh-word; the 
speaker uses no to express his inability to specify this value.  That is why 
wh-questions with no like (23b) indicate that the speaker cannot specify the value of 
the wh-word because of his inability to expect it and thus totally depends on the 
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hearer for the specification of the value; on the other hand, wh-questions without no 
like (23a) signal that the speaker can expect and specify the value of the wh-word 
and thus is involved in its specification. 
     The analysis here can account for the omissibility of no observed by Yoshida 
(2012).  I would first like to introduce the notion D(iscourse)-linked.  According 
to Pesetsky (1987:108), the wh-phrase in a question like Which book did you read? 
is D-linked in that “the range of felicitous answers is limited by a set of books both 
speaker and hearer have in mind”; on the other hand, the wh-phrase how many 
angels in How many angels fit on the head of a pin? is non-D-linked in that “there is 
no presumption that either speaker or hearer has a particular set or quantity of angels 
in mind.”  Yoshida (2012) points out that D-linked wh-phrases allow no to be 
absent in wh-questions.  For example: 
 
 (24)  Dono hon-o yondeiru (no)? 
   which book-Acc reading Mir 
   ‘Which book are you reading?’ (Yoshida (2012:1606)) 
 
Suppose that the speaker and the hearer have been assigned homework which 
requires them to choose a book from a list of readings and to read it, and the speaker 
is asking the hearer which book he is reading (I have slightly changed the context 
Yoshida gives).  The wh-phrase in this context is interpreted to be D-linked, which, 
according to Yoshida, makes the omission of no possible.  On the other hand, the 
following wh-question does not allow us to drop no: 
 
 (25)  Nani-o yondeiru #(no)? 
   what-Acc reading Mir 
   ‘What are you reading?’ (Yoshida (2012:1606)) 
 
Suppose that the speaker finds the hearer reading a book but he has no idea what 
book the hearer is reading.  Because the speaker does not know possible candidates 
for the book the hearer is reading, the wh-phrase in this context is non-D-linked.  In 
this case, no is not allowed to be dropped from the sentence.8   
                                                  
8 Yoshida (2012) gives an explanation to the facts shown in (24) and (25) by assuming that 
no is a question marker.  However, it is syntactically a nominalizer, not a question marker (cf. 
Kuno (1980)).  For one thing, it can be used in declarative sentences: 
 
 (i) A: Nani-o yondeiru no? (= (25)) 
  B: Rebinson-no puragumatikkusu-o yondeiru no. 
   Levinson-Gen Pragmatics-Acc reading Mir 
   ‘I’m reading Pragmatics written by Levinson.’ 
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     These facts can be accounted for by assuming that no in wh-questions signals 
that the speaker cannot expect the value of the wh-words.  When wh-words are 
non-D-linked as in (25), the speaker cannot specify the value of the wh-words 
because he does not know a set of possible values; in other words, he is incapable of 
expecting the value.  That is why no is obligatorily used when wh-words are 
non-D-linked.  On the other hand, when wh-words are D-linked as in (24), the 
speaker can select the most plausible value from candidates.  So he relatively easily 
expects which value is the most plausible one.  That is why no is allowed to be 
omitted from the wh-questions.  It should be noticed here that D-linked wh-words 
does not necessarily imply that the speaker can always expect the value of the 
wh-words.  Even if he knows the member of a set of possible values, he, in some 
cases, cannot expect which value is the correct one.  In such cases, we must use no 
to indicate our inability to expect the value.  For example: 
 
 (26)  A:  Kono prezento-wa dare-ga kureta to omou? Hanako, 
     this present-Top who-Nom gave that think Hanako 
     Yooko soretomo Zyunko? 
     Yoko or Zyunko 
     ‘Which girl do you think gave me this present, Hanako, Yoko, or 
Zyunko?’ 
   B:  Zenzen wakaranai yo.   Dono ko-kara moratta ??(no)? 
     at all know-not SFP which girl-from received Mir 
     ‘I have no idea.  From which girl did you receive it?’ 
 
Here, speaker A is enumerating candidates who gave him the present.  So the 
wh-word Dono-ko ‘which girl’ in speaker B’s utterance is D-linked.  As is clear 
from speaker B’s first utterance, he expresses his inability to select one girl among 
the three.  In other words, he cannot expect the correct answer to speaker A’s 
question, which makes the use of no obligatory.9 
 
4.  Mirativity and Handanbun/Gensyoobun 
     This section deals with examples which might appear to be counterexamples 
to the analysis developed so far.  Let us consider the following example (cf. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Here, speaker B replies to speaker A’s question with no, which means that it is not specialized in 
marking sentences as questions.   
9 Kuno (1980) claims that no serves to widen the scope of the interrogative particle ka, 
whose scope is, according to Kuno, confined to the element next to it; to put it simply, it is used for 
the grammatical purpose in interrogative sentences (for details, see Kuno (1980); see also Takubo 
(1987) and Kuwabara (2013)).  The discussion in this section, however, suggests that the use of no 
is triggered by pragmatic, not syntactic, motivation. 
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Tanomura (1990)): 
 
 (27)  [The speaker hangs the laundry outside at night before going to bed.  The 
next morning, he realizes that it is raining.] 
  * Ame  na n da! 
   rain  Cop Mir Cop 
   ‘It’s raining!’ 
 
In (27), the speaker suddenly realizes that it is raining.  Judging from the context, 
the speaker does not expect that it is raining in the morning.  We can thus predict 
that no can be used in this context, but the sentence in (27) in fact sounds unnatural; 
here, no (and da) must be omitted, i.e., Ame da! (the copula na in (27) becomes da 
here). 
     However, the unacceptability in (27) reflects a certain property of mirativity.  
As Dickinson (2000:381) puts it, mirativity “essentially delineate[s] the speaker’s 
relationship, either physically or psychologically, to experienced events and states”; 
more specifically, “a mirative marker indicates the relationship the information 
coded in the proposition has to the speaker’s overall expectations and assumptions.”  
The speaker thus must evaluate, in the light of his overall knowledge, whether or not 
the information in question is unexpected (cf. Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012)):  the 
speaker first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a judgment on 
whether this recognized event, object, etc. is unexpected information (see 
Guentchéva (1994) for related discussion).10  So we can predict that mirative 
sentences are incompatible with what Japanese linguists have traditionally called 
genshoobun (lit. ‘phenomenon-sentences’), which is paired with handanbun (lit. 
‘judgement-sentences’).  Genshoobun is sentences which merely describe events 
and states, while Handanbun is sentences in which the speaker’s subjective 
judgement is involved.  Generally speaking, handanbun contains the topic marker 
wa, whereas genshoobun does not.  Consider the following examples: 
 
 (28)  a.  Kodomo-wa naite iru. 
     dog-Top cry being 
     ‘The child is crying.’ 
 
                                                  
10 In fact, Kuroda (1973:380) notes that the sentence-final particle no “serves as a marker to 
indicate that some ‘second order’ assertion, so to speak, is made with respect to the proposition 
expressed by the sentence to which [no] is attached.”  That is to say, no indicates that the speaker 
first recognizes an event, an object, etc., and then makes a certain judgment on that recognized 
event, object, etc. (see also Hayashi (1964)). 
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   b.  Kodomo-ga naite iru. 
     dog-Nom cry being 
     ‘A child is crying.’ 
 
In (28a), which contains the topic marker wa, the speaker is making a judgment on 
the child in question; that is, he first recognizes the existence of a child and then 
judges that he is crying.  In (28b), on the other hand, wa does not appear and thus 
the sentence is interpreted to be a statement merely describing the situation where a 
child is crying.  No reflects the speaker’s subjective judgement in the sense that it 
indicates that he evaluates the information in question as unexpected.  It is thus 
assumed not to occur in genshoobun. 
Let us now turn back to example (27).  In this example, the speaker is 
assumed to be merely expressing what he has just recognized.  That is to say, the 
sentence is interpreted to be a genshoobun.  In fact, it is impossible to supply the 
sentence in (27), with or without no, with the topic phrase X-wa, such as Kyoo-wa 
‘today-Top,’ which is a sign of handanbun (i.e., *Kyoo-wa ame da!/ *Kyoo-wa ame 
na n da!).  The unacceptability in (27) can thus be attributed to the incompatibility 
between no and genshoobun (see also Noda (1997) for related discussion).  We can 
here predict that the sentence in (27) becomes acceptable if it is put in a context 
where a certain topic phrase can be linguistically manifested.  This prediction is 
borne out by the following example: 
 
 (29)  [The speaker looks out of a window and realizes that it is raining.] 
   (Kyoo-wa) ame na n da. 
 
In (27), the speaker has a sense of urgency because the laundry gets wet, but in (29), 
the speaker does not have such a sense.  In this case, we can supply the topic 
phrase kyoo-wa ‘today,’ as shown in the parentheses, which means that the sentence 
is a manifestation of the speaker’s subjective judgement.  Hence, the sentence in 
(29) is potentially compatible with mirative judgement, which is expressed by no.   
 
5.  Unexpectedness to the Hearer 
     So far, I have argued that the sentence-final particle no expresses unexpected 
information to the speaker.  This semantic property of no is in conformity with a 
typological tendency of mirative markers; a number of mirative markers found in 
other languages are associated with unexpectedness to the speaker.  In fact, when it 
comes to definitions of mirativity, the word speaker often appears in such definitions.  
According to DeLancey (1997:33), for example, “the function of [mirativity] is to 
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mark sentences which report information which is new or surprising to the speaker,” 
or Aikhenvald (2004:209) says that mirativity is a linguistic category “whose 
primary meaning is speaker’s unprepared mind, unexpected new information, and 
concomitant surprise” (the underlines are mine).  Hengeveld and Olbertz 
(2012:488), however, point out that mirativity “will often be used in circumstances 
in which the proposition is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the speaker, 
but may also be used when it is newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising for the 
addressee” (see also Aikhenvald (2012)).  Let us consider the following Kalasha 
example: 
 
 (30)  �Amerika  bo �hu tala dur kai �śi -an �hu la. 
   America very high house make Past.Pf.3Pl become.Past.Infer.3 
   ‘In America there are very tall buildings.’ (DeLancey (1997:47)) 
 
The example in (30) “could be said by someone who is returning from the wide 
world with stories for his fellow villagers” (Delancey (1997:47)).  So, “in this 
context the proposition is not one for which the speaker does not have a 
psychological preparation, but rather one that is new for the addressee” (Hengeveld 
and Olbertz (2012:488)).  They conclude from examples like (30) that “mirativity 
could simply be defined as ‘a linguistic category that characterizes a proposition as 
newsworthy, unexpected, or surprising’” (Hengeveld and Olbertz (2012:488)); the 
notion speaker should be excluded from the definition of mirativity. 
The sentence-final particle no is noteworthy in typological terms because it 
expresses unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer, supporting 
Hengeveld and Olbertz’s (2012) proposal.  Let us consider the following example: 
 
 (31)  Boku ne, konban deeto na n desu.  
   I   you know this evening date Cop Mir Cop.Pol 
   ‘I’m going on a date this evening.’ 
(Kikuchi (2000:37), with slight modifications) 
 
Here, the speaker is revealing to the hearer that he is going on a date.  The 
information conveyed is assumed to have already been established to the speaker 
and thus it is not unexpected information to him.  Rather, in (31), the speaker is 
conveying unexpected information to the hearer.  
     The following conversation will make this point clearer: 
 
 
i aʾ  bo     huʾtala dur kai    śiʾ-an huʾl .
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 (32)  A:  Kimi-wa Akiko-to kon’yaku sita sooda ne. 
     you-Top Akiko-to engagement got Evid(hearsay) SFP(you know) 
     ‘I hear you got engaged to Akiko.’ 
   B:  Iya tigau. Boku-wa Hanako-to kon’yaku sita n da. 
     no wrong I-Top Hanako-to engagement got Mir Cop 
     ‘No, that’s wrong.  I got engaged to Hanako.’ 
(Inoue (1974:288)) 
 
Here, speaker A first believes that speaker B got engaged to Akiko.  Speaker B then 
denies it and gives the correct information that the woman to whom he got engaged 
is Hanako.  It is obvious that the sentence with no brings unexpected information to 
speaker A.  In this situation, no (and the following copula da) cannot be omitted 
(i.e., *Boku-wa Hanako-to kon’yaku sita.).  This is because the sentence without no 
does not signal that the information is unexpected to speaker A, and thus is 
incompatible with the context. 
   The following example also lends support to the analysis here: 
 
 (33)  A:  Ano mise-ni hai-re-nakatta. 
     that shop-Dat enter-be able to-not.Past 
     ‘I was turned away from that shop.’ 
   B:(*) Kimi-wa miseenen na n da yo. 
     you-Top under age Cop Mir Cop SFP 
     ‘You are under age.’ 
 
Speaker B’s utterance can be interpreted to be either acceptable or unacceptable 
depending on the context.  Let us first consider the context where this sentence is 
unacceptable.  The information that speaker A is under age is assumed to be 
evident to him because age is part of one’s personal information.  In other words, 
this information is not unexpected to speaker A.  No in (33) thus introduces 
expected information, yielding an unnatural sentence.  Speaker B’s utterance, 
however, becomes natural in a context where he tries to make speaker A remember 
his age.  Because of the fact that speaker A tried to enter a shop for adults, speaker 
B treats speaker A as if speaker A forgot his own age.  In this case, the information 
that speaker A is under age is interpreted as if it were unexpected information to him, 
which makes the use of no fully acceptable.   
     The fact that no expresses unexpectedness to the hearer as well as the speaker 
shows the importance of Hengeveld and Olbertz’s (2012) work.  Mirativity should 
be defined without recourse to the notion speaker; it is neutral in that the definition 
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does not specify to whom the information in question is unexpected. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
     Typological studies have recently paid attention to the semantic category 
mirativity since the seminal work of DeLancey (1997).  There are, however, very 
few studies which investigate Japanese grammatical mirative markers.  Hoping to 
promote the study of mirativity in Japanese, I attempted to clarify that the 
sentence-final particle no is a grammatical mirative marker.  I also argued that the 
mirative marker no has a noteworthy function in typological terms; it expresses 
unexpectedness to not only the speaker but also the hearer. 
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